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Occasionally the American nation sees itself in the life of one of its
citizens. Something about the experiences, background, attitudes, or
accomplishments of an individual seems particularly evocative of Amer-
ican culture, or at least a vision thereof. Such a life was that of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes. In addition to being a man of great popular
appeal,' Holmes has held considerable interest for the intellectual com-
munity. From the publication of Holmes's The Common Law in 1881
until the present day, legal scholars, philosophers, political scientists,
historians, literary critics, and journalists2 have attempted to understand
and articulate the qualities that have made Holmes, in their eyes, an
especially noteworthy representative of American civilization. This
article traces the changing image of one man in the eyes of American
intellectuals through the years-the "rise and fall" of Justice Holmes.
I. INTRODUCTION
American intellectuals have focused on Holmes in three capacities:
as Brahmin, as ideologue, and as stylist. The shifting image of Holmes
in the American scholarly community reflects changes in the attitude of
intellectuals toward Holmes in each capacity.
The term Brahmin suggests Holmes's close association with a Boston
tradition of social privilege and intellectual enterprise. During the
twenty years following Holmes's birth in 1841, Boston and its surround-
ing countryside produced the first major concentration of intellectual
activity in American history. The individuals who made contributions,
t Member of the District of Columbia Bar. The author wrote this article as Visiting
Scholar, American Bar Foundation, 1970-71. He is indebted to Holly Hartstone Rose of
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I Holmes has been the only Supreme Court Justice in American history whose life has
been the subject of a Broadway play, The Magnificent Yankee, which appeared in 1951.
2 The enumerated groups compose the "American intellectual community" for the
purposes of this essay. Journalists include writers for the New York Times, the New York
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which ranged from discoveries in natural science to poetry, were from
wealthy or socially respectable families. Many had traveled to Europe in
their youth, some for educational purposes; many had attended Har-
vard College, some also reading law for a time; a distinct minority,
such as the Adamses, had served in the government.3
Of those names associated with Brahminism-Parkman, Agassiz,
James, Lowell, Emerson, Longfellow, Parker, to list some-that of
Holmes was among the most celebrated. At his son's birth Dr. Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Sr. had already gained notice for an emotional appeal
on behalf of the threatened U.S. Constitution.4 During Holmes's youth
his father had enhanced his professional status with an influential paper
on puerperal fever 5 and ultimately emerged as the leading social his-
torian of his time with the publication of The Autocrat of the Break-
fast Table.6 The success of the elder Holmes and the equal success of
Holmes, Jr. in a different area of endeavor, coupled with an unmistak-
able tension between father and son,7 has served as a starting point for
scholarly explorations into the relationship between Holmes and his
heritage. The explorations have revealed a relationship rich in ambi-
guities.
The Brahmins were "gentlemen" at a time when that ityle of life was
still considered a profession. Gentlemanliness stood not only for edu-
cated refinement in intellect, taste, and culture, but also for snobbish-
ness and class consciousness. There is abundant evidence that Holmes
was as fastidious, clubbish, and condescending as any of his peers.8
Moreover, he possessed high intellectual standards and was generally
critical of even those works he considered worth reading.9 He also held
rather elitist political views, confessing late in his life that the only
justification he found for a government's undertaking to rectify social
ills was "an aristocratic assumption that you know what is good for
them better than they (which no doubt you do)."' 0
S See generally V. BROOKS, THE FLOWERING or NEW ENGLAND (1936).
4 O.W. Holmes, Sr., Old Ironsides, Boston Daily Advertiser, Sept. 16, 1830.
5 O.W. Holmes, Sr., The Contagiousness of Puerperal Fever, NEW ENGLAND J. MEDICINE
A1D SURGERY, Apr., 1843.
6 O.W. HOLMES, SR., THE AuTocRAT OF THE BREAKFAST TABLr. (1858); see M. HowE,
HOLMES OF THE BREAKFAST TABLE (1939).
7 See C. BOWEN, YANKEE FROm OLYMPUS (1943); M. HOWE, JuSrICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS, 1841-1870 (1957).
8 See Hamilton, On Dating Justice Holmes, 9 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1941); Kurland, Portrait
of the Jurist as a Young Mind, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 205 (1957); Llewellyn, Holmes, 35
CoLum. L. REv. 485 (1935); Sergeant, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 49 NEW REPUBLIC 59 (1926).
9 Hamilton, supra note 8; Llewellyn, supra note 8.
10 Letter from Oliver 'Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski, July 23, 1925, in I HOLMES-
LASKI LmERs 762 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
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Alongside these aristocratic characteristics, however, existed counter-
tendencies. After a convivial youth as Harvard undergraduate and club-
man, Holmes largely withdrew from social contacts with his peers for
approximately ten years. He had virtually no intimate friends during
his adult life, but his major correspondence friendships were with non-
Brahmins. Although he fervently desired to make an intellectual name
for himself before his fortieth birthday," he was contemptuous of his
father's role as all-purpose man of letters.12 If Holmes favored govern-
ment by elites, he believed in sharply curtailing the powers of the
elitist judicial branch;' 3 if he "loathe[d] the thick-fingered clowns we
call the people . . . -vulgar, selfish, and base," 14 he praised "that
instinct that makes the American unable to meet his fellow man other-
wise than simply as a man."' 5
Holmes's ideology was as ambiguous as his identification with his
heritage. He emerged from adolescence an agnostic and an opponent
both of time-honored moral pieties and of inexorable axioms governing
scholarship. Later in his life, his agnosticism merged with a theory of
government that stressed the importance of power relationships. Never-
theless, he retained an apparently passionate devotion to the act of
believing in ideals-as distinguished from any particular ideals them-
selves-and a faith in the redeeming powers of social evolution. The
combination of these potentially contradictory precepts has confounded
those who have studied Holmes as ideologue. The "nutshell" words
for Holmes abound: positivist,16 Darwinist,17 skeptic,18 cynic,19 ideal-
iSt,20 romanticist,21 mystic, 22 progressive,23 patriot.2 4 Each suggests an
aspect of his thought, but no one word can accurately describe the
whole.
Holmes has been equally interesting to American intellectuals as a
11 M. HowE, JusncE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS, 1870-1882 (1963).
12 M. HowE, supra note 7, at 19-21.
13 E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (dissenting opinion).
14 Quoted in TOUCHED WITH FIRE: CIVIL WAR LmrRs AND DIARY OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR. 71 (M. HowE ed. 1947).
15 Quoted in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs 25 (M.
Howe ed. 1962).
16 Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1951).
17 Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 3, 254 (1965).
Is M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FArri OF JUSTICE HOLMEs (1943).
'9 Mencken, The Great Holmes Mystery, 26 AMEmCAN MERCURY 123 (1932).
20 M. HowE, supra note 7.
21 Id.
22 Boorstin, The Elusiveness of Mr. Justice Holmes, 14 NEw ENGLAND Q. 478 (1941).
23 R. FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 227-28 (1968).
24 Villard, Issues and Men: The Great Judge, 140 NATION 523 (1935).
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judicial stylist. In a profession in which the mode of expression charac-
teristically has been technical, formal, depersonalized, and restrained,
Holmes's opinions are remarkable for their absence of technicalities,
their informality, their liveliness, and their poetic flights of language.
Holmes's style is better described as a deviation from the judicial norm
than as an improvement on it. If clarity, precision, and "reasoned
elaboration" 25 can be said to be ideals of judicial opinion writing,
Holmes appears to have eschewed these goals in the pursuit of terseness
and ambiguity. His opinions have been called as difficult to understand
as they are easy to read.26
In each of the above capacities, then, Holmes is not only interesting
but controversial. As Brahmin, he provokes comment at two levels: his
position evokes the tension of social privilege and intellectual superior-
ity in an increasingly socially mobile and mass-educated society; his
behavior contains the emotional conflict inherent in a man rejecting
his social heritage. As ideologue, his stances raise a series of questions,
among them whether power should be the controlling basis of social
arrangements and whether social evolution is inevitable. As stylist, his
method of judicial communication invites inquiries as to the value of
a decision-making process that expresses its conclusions by unelaborated
formulae.
The ambiguities and controversy surrounding Holmes have emerged
as his image has changed in the eyes of the American intellectual com-
munity. Commentators have woven his thoughts and attitudes into
their own social, political, or intellectual preoccupations. As those pre-
occupations have shifted, the image of Holmes has changed accordingly.
II. THE CHANGING IMAGE OF JuSTICE HOLMES
Holmes's image may be evaluated in six time segments: (1) 1881 (pub-
lication of The Common Law) to 1902 (appointment to the Supreme
Court), (2) 1903 to 1931 (retirement from the bench), (3) 1932 to 1940,
(4) 1941 to 1949, (5) 1950 to 1959, and (6) 1960 to the present. Broadly
speaking, each time segment is marked by a dominant intellectual
attitude; these attitudes I have termed scientism, progressivism, hero
worship, demythology, a sense of alienation, and libertarianism-egali-
tarianism. The time segments are, of course, only approximations for
the sake of convenience, since changes in intellectual attitudes do not
occur with chronological precision. The segments are intended to con-
vey a general sense of the points in time at which one overriding per-
25 Cf. H. HART & A. SACSs, TH IEGAL PROCESS (tentative ed. 1958).
26 Rogat, supra note 17, at-9-1O."
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ception of Holmes began to be replaced by another, rather than to
demarcate any abrupt changes in intellectual attitude.
The term "image," as used in this article, is a construct representing
the perceptions of a variety of articulate individuals about a public
figure. Like any construct employed to derive collective meaning from
individual attitudes, it is imperfect. This imperfection flows from the
diversity of intellectual viewpoints during any historical period. The
primary purposes of this investigation of Holmes's reputation are to
emphasize the complexity of the process by which the reputation of a
judge is established and to demonstrate the way in which the image
of a man is shaped by the attitudes of his critics.
A. 1881-1902: Holmes as Scientist
The late nineteenth century intelligensia in America were obsessed
with what would now be known as model building. Religious and
spiritual principles appeared to them to have been made obsolete by
more measurable rules of science. The universe, they had discovered,
could be explained in terms of recurrent, predictable phenomena such
as evolution and competition. Holmes's The Common Law, his con-
temporaries felt, was in the mainstream of the scientific movement in
that it systematized jurisprudence on the basis of observable social
phenomena rather than through intellectual abstractions. The theories
advanced by Holmes; such as the external standard of liability in tort
law, were said to rest on "a series of scientific observations" and were
thought to indicate "the advance which the common law is now making
toward a more scientific structure than it has ever before possessed. '27
By announcing that the felt necessities of the time governed the formu-
lation of policy in the courts, Holmes was setting forth a tangible set
of materials on which to erect a jurisprudential system, hence bringing
"the ... office of the courts . . . into unaccustomed dearness. '28 By
1899 a commentator announced that The Common Law was "every-
where regarded as a scientific work."2 9
Scientism, in the late nineteenth century, was intellectual radicalism,
since it attempted to shift the source of scholarly axioms away from the
intuitions and abstractions of an educated elite of religious believers.
To believe in science was to challenge established faiths. Insofar as it
questioned a set of traditional social values, scientism was associated
with political radicalism, and -there were those who thought that
27 Book Review, 26 AL ANY L.J. 484, 486 (1882).
28 Book Review, 15 AM. L. Rv. 331 (1881).
29 Note, 33 AM. L. Rv. 753, 754 (1899).
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Holmes had tendencies in this direction. In 1899 two law reviews
labeled Holmes a radical, pointing particularly to his dissent in
Vegelahn v. Guntner,30 in which Holmes had disassociated himself
from a majority ruling upholding an injunction prohibiting peaceful
picketing by strikers and had announced that "combination [on the
part of labor] is a necessary and desirable counterpart [of combination
on the part of capital] if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal
way."81 Reviewers found such "radical" language "strange ... from a
man of [Holmes's] environments. 32
Late nineteenth century intellectuals were most interested in Holmes
as ideologue. His privileged social position was not regarded as signifi-
cant to commentators-the only negative remarks made about Holmes's
heritage were issued by Wendell Phillips, himself a Brahmin, who
complained in 1895 about the unfortunate tendency of Holmes and
other of his contemporaries to equate war with heroism.33 As a stylist,
Holmes suffered from too facile an identification with his father. Those
who attempted to analyze his opinions or writings invariably prefaced
their remarks with a reference to the literary contributions of Dr.
Holmes. At his sixtieth birthday, after twenty years on the Massachu-
setts bench, Holmes had not fully emerged as a unique and original
figure. What reputation he had made for himself by 1902 flowed mainly
from his efforts to make the study of the law more scientific. -
B. 1903-1931: Holmes as Progressive
The late nineteenth century intellectual community insisted that
formal logical arguments rest on a more scientific foundation than
intuitive personal insights, but it was by no means prepared to aban-
don the use of abstract, deductive reasoning as an academic and peda-
gogic tool. Syllogistic reasoning from assumed intellectual principles
represented the primary mode of thought and expression of the time.
After 1900, however, not only the content of particular academic
axioms but the formalistic reasoning process itself came increasingly
under attack.34 Antiformalism in the early twentieth century intellec-
tual community was a manifestation of the broader ideological move-
ment known as progressivism. Progressivism emphasized the constantly
changing nature of society and the need for testing social propositions
and intellectual theories on the basis of contemporary experience. It
;o 167 Mass. 92, 104 (1896).
31 Id. at 108.
32 Note, Judge Holmes' Opinions, 60 ALBANY L.J. 118 (1899).
33 Phillips, Sentimental Jingoism, 61 NATIoN 440 (1895).
34 Cf. M. WFrr, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AM-RICA (1968).
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resisted abstractions that could not be shown to be responsive to modem
social conditions and was consequently hostile to intellectual discourse
that appeared to rest on untested or untestable assumptions. In particu-
lar, progressivism denied the existence of permanent "laws" that gov-
erned intellectual disciplines. It preferred dominant academic or ideo-
logical trends to emerge through a process of experimentation whereby
those ideas or policies that proved useful in achieving "progress"
achieved dominant status until they were replaced by still more "pro-
gressive" concepts.35
In its political form, the progressive movement believed in the
management of government by experts responsible to but not deferen-
tial toward the public. Progressives sought to expand the public sector
of government in order to substitute decision making by an educated,
efficient group of impartial administrators for decision making by
partisan representatives of special interest groups. Progressive public
policy envisaged the expansion of the executive branch of government,
primarily in the form of administrative regulatory agencies, at the
expense of Congress and the courts. Progressives urged federal or state
legislation that attempted to create executive regulatory schemes and
demanded a large measure of judicial tolerance for such legislation.
They were particularly incensed at the attempts by judges to substitute
nineteenth century economic axioms for empirical analyses of con-
temporary economic conditions.30
The reexamination of American social values stimulated by pro-
gressivism led ultimately to a reexamination of the movement itself.
In its early years, at the opening of the twentieth century, the move-
ment simultaneously embraced empirical relativism and moral abso-
lutism, advocating social change in accordance with time-honored
standards of behavior, such as honesty, industry, and temperance. But
as its adherents became more impressed with the impermanence of
ideas and institutions, they came to question the inviolability of their
once-cherished moral principles. The result was a sweeping attack
on the dominant social mores of the late nineteenth century, which
were dismissed as "Victorian" and "Puritan."
Holmes's career on the Supreme Court coincided with the domi-
nance of progressivism as an intellectual force in American life. His
relationship with the movement itself was complex. Insofar as progres-
sivism meant social or political reform, Holmes had little sympathy for
85 Cf. D. NOBLE, THE PARADOX OF PROGRESSIVE THOUGHT (1958).
36 Cf. White, The Social Values of the Progressives: Some New Perspectives, 70 S. AT-
LANTic Q. 62 (1971).
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the movement. In 1915 he told John Wigmore that "the squashy
sentimentalism of a big minority of our people about human life"
made him "puke." Among that minority Holmes placed those "who
believe in the upward and onward-who talk of uplift, who think
that something particular has happened and that the universe is no
longer predatory."37 Holmes continued to believe in nineteenth cen-
tury concepts of classical economics, which the progressives repudiated,
and nineteenth century social theories, such as that proposed by Mal-
thus, which assumed an inherent imperfectibility in the bulk of man-
kind. He failed to share in any degree the progressives' faith in man's
innate goodness or their missionary zeal to inculcate others with their
moral beliefs. He remained throughout his life supremely indifferent
to social welfare schemes of any sort, with the possible exception of
eugencies. 38
Nevertheless, the progressives found Holmes an especially attractive
and sympathetic judicial figure and contributed to the growth of his
stature. By an accident of history, Holmes ascended the Supreme Court
bench at a time when a series of constitutional issues were before the
Court that progressives considered to be of great importance. The
issues involved the constitutionality of state and federal legislative
schemes, such as workmen's compensation and wages-and-hours reg-
ulation, in which governmental bodies asserted control over private
economic relationships. This power the progressives regarded as es-
sential to their campaign to reduce the influence of "special interests."
In a series of opinions from 1903 to 1923, Holmes announced his
willingness to tolerate legislative experiments and his contempt for
judges who used constitutional provisions to further their own social
or economic prejudices. 39 The paradigmatic situation Holmes ad-
dressed in these years was that posed by Lochner v. New York,40 in
which Justice Peckham, for the majority, had found a New York stat-
ute establishing maximum work hours for bakers inconsistent with the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because it interfered
with the right of laborers to work as many hours as they wished. Holmes
found Peckham's position to be an artificial application of the so-called
37 Quoted in M. HowE, supra note 7, at 25.
38 Cf. Rogat, supra note 17, at 282-89.
39 E.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 567 (1923) (dissenting opinion);
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921) (dissenting opinion); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (dissenting opinion); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 190
(1908) (dissenting opinion); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (dissenting
opinion); Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903).
40 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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liberty-of-contract doctrine41 in the face of conditions in the baking
industry that rendered that doctrine meaningless. He stressed the rea-
sonableness of beliefs on the part of New York legislators that the
working environment of bakers was deleterious to their health and
deferred to these beliefs, without endorsing the soundness of the maxi-
mum hours law itself.
Progressives considered Holmes's exposure of the deficiencies of
abstract judicial reasoning and his tolerance for the programs of leg-
islative majorities to be manifestations of judicial statesmanship of
the highest order. In a series of articles, Felix Frankfurter celebrated
Holmes for his ability to separate his personal views from his legal
opinions, for his resistance to doctrinaire interpretation, for his un-
derstanding of social and economic forces, and for his willingness to
allow legislative experimentation. Frankfurter's opinions were echoed
by others, including James Tufts, 43 Roscoe Pound,44 and John Dewey.45
Praising Holmes's grasp of "economic forces," Charles Carpenter de-
dared in 1929 that "no judge who has sat upon the bench has ever
been more progressive in his attitude."46 Walter Wheeler Cook and
Jerome Frank saw in Holmes's interpretation of his office the advent
of a new school of jurisprudence. Cook asked rhetorically in 1921:
"How many.., among law teachers, not to mention judges and prac-
ticing lawyers,... 'consider the ends which [legal] rules seek to accom-
plish, the reasons why those ends are desired, what is given up to
gain them, and whether they are worth the price?"' "[M]uch mission-
ary work remains to be done," Cook maintained, "before the methods
of legal thinking exemplified [by Holmes] become characteristic of...
the leaders of the legal profession. '47 Frank, nine years later, hailed
41 Cf. Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ. 454 (1909).
42 Frankfurter, The Constitutional Opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes, 29 HARv. L. R-v.
683, 691, 693, 694 (1916); Frankfurter, Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holmes' Constitutional
Opinions, 36 HARV. L. Rxv. 909, 927, 929 (1923); Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the
Constitution, 41 HARv. L. REV. 121, 132, 134 (1927).
43 "Holmes has . . . firmly set himself against a slack universe of legal conceptions
and a rigidly fixed social order" and "has sought to give man room to express his ad-
vancing needs in an orderly progressing society." Tufts, The Legal and Social Philosophy
of Mr. Justice Holmes, 7 A.B.A.J. 359 (1921).
44 Pound discussed Holmes's "conscious facing of the problem of harmonizing or com-
promising conflicting or overlapping interests .... Pound, 'Judge Holmes's' Contribu-
tions to the Science of Law, 34 HARv. L. Rn'. 449, 450 (1921).
45 Dewey stressed Holmes's "impatience with the attempt to settle matters of social
policy by dialectic reasoning from fixed concepts" and his "faith that .. . our social system
is one of experimentation, subject to the ordeal of experienced consequences." Dewey,
Justice Holmes and the Liberal Mind, 53 NEW REPUBLIC 210, 211 (1928).
46 Carpenter, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jurist, 8 Oa. L. REV. 269, 270 (1929).
47 Cook, Book Review, 30 YA.a L.J. 775, 776 (1921).
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Holmes for "abandon[ing], once and for all, the phantasy of a perfect,
consistent, legal uniformity . . . " "As a consequence," Frank felt,
"whatever clear [sense] of legal realities we have attained in this coun-
try in the past twenty-five years is in large measure due to him....
[Holmes] has developed that remarkable tolerance which is the mark
of high maturity. . . His legal skepticism is clear, sane, vital, pro-
gressive .... 4
One of the social issues to which progressives turned their attention
was the place of social privilege in American society. On one level,
progressivism was a movement to expand the classes of beneficiaries of
governmental reforms and consequently to achieve a more egalitarian
society. On another, it represented a reentry of social and intellectual
elites into positions of public influence. In specific reforms such as
the conservation movement, progressive rhetoric emphasized the im-
portance of diffusing the power of monopolists and of improving the
life style of small farmers, while progressive programs envisaged the
management of conservation programs by an educated elite of tech-
nocrats.19 In general terms, social privilege was not itself regarded
as an evil by progressives, provided that individuals of high status
demonstrated a sense of social responsibility and a concern for the
less fortunate classes.
With some strain, early twentieth century commentators sought to
demonstrate these qualities in Holmes. They attempted this through
association of Holmes with two symbols: the socially conscious Puritan
and the aristocrat as democrat. The first symbol was an artful redefini-
tion of Puritanism. For early twentieth century American intellectuals,
Puritanism symbolized a moral rigidity and parochialism that came
increasingly to be considered old-fashioned. But it also suggested an
adherence to the dictates of one's conscience. Certain supporters of
Holmes tended to stress his social conscience, which they linked to his
Puritan heritage. They insisted that Holmes was "a Puritan whom
doubt had civilized" so that his "Puritan strength" appeared not as a
religious dogma but as a "simple conviction" that the democratic ideals
of American civilization should be upheld.5 0 Life for Holmes was "a
rich but a responsible adventure" in which the "natural Puritan aris-
tocracy" functioned as caretakers of democracy.rl
Thus Holmes, especially during his last years on the bench, came
to be considered "an aristocrat with a genuine interest in the welfare
48 J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODEN MIND 253, 257, 259 (1930).
49 Cf. G. WHITE, THE EASTERN ESTABLISHMENT AND THE WESTERN EXPEIENCE (1968).
60 Littell, Books and Things, 3 NEw REPUBLIC 100 (1915).
51 Sergeant, Oliver Wendell Holmnes, 49 NEW REPuBLIC 59, 60 (1926).
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of the common man. "52 Those attracted to the symbol of Holmes as
an aristocratic democrat emphasized the social implications of his free
speech opinions. In these cases the defendants whose rights Holmes
championed were conspicuously disadvantaged persons, being impov-
erished immigrantse 3
Holmes's style was not controversial among members of the early
twentieth century intellectual community. Their overriding concern
was that judicial opinions not exhibit the abstract reasoning charac-
terized by Roscoe Pound as "mechanical jurisprudence";4 on this
point Holmes's opinions were eminently satisfying, since they eschewed
that process altogether. Holmes's tendency toward formulaic expres-
sion was seen by commentators as fresh rather than cryptic. Judge
Benjamin Cardozo, himself an aspiring stylist, remarked that "one
almost writhes in despair at the futility ... of imitation or approach"
upon confronting Holmes's "pointed phrases." 55
In his metamorphosis from scientist to progressive, Holmes stood
on the threshold of deification. He stepped from his father's shadow
by transcending his privileged background through tolerance and sym-
pathy for thoughts and life styles foreign to his own. To observers of
progressive persuasion his sense of the impermanency of ideas and
intellectual axioms became "realism" or "sociological jurisprudence";
his willingness to defer to the wishes of those holding positions of
political power became a belief in social experimentation; his tendency
to believe that social upheavals were infrequent and that words alone
rarely threatened the fabric of society became a faith in free speech;
his general indifference to social problems and political issues became
enlightened judicial self-restraint. He lacked only a historical vindica-
tion of his attitudes toward judicial decision making and political
arrangements-which, after 1931, he received.
C. 1932-1940: Holmes as Myth
Reviewing in 1941 the ten years that had passed since Holmes's re-
tirement, Walton Hamilton found that Holmes had emerged as a
52 Pollard, Justice Holmes, Champion of the Common Man, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1929,
§ 4, at 4, col. 1.
53 E.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653 (1929) (dissenting opinion);
Schenck v. United States. 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
624 (1919) (dissenting opinion). In the correspondence attendant upon the Schwimmer
decision, in which WASP militarist Holmes made courteous replies to the tributes of Rus-
sian Jewish pacifist Rosika Schwimmer, readers saw another manifestation of the Brahmin's
tolerance for ideologies and life styles alien to his own. See Sergeant, supra note 51, at 60.
54 Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L. Rav. 605 (1908).
55 Cardozo, Mr. Justice 4lolmes, 44 HAsv. L. Rv. 682, 689 (1931).
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"deity... an Olympian who in judgment could do no wrong. His
opinions were norms by which to measure the departures of his Court
from the true path of the law." "The neat phrase, the quotable line,"
Hamilton observed, "were ultimates; and beauty of form was com-
muted into wisdom of utterance. For the Court, but especially in dis-
sent, thus spake Holmes and the subject was closed." 56 The years from
1932 to 1940 witnessed the apotheosis of Holmes. His human qualities
were enhanced in the eyes of the world: the moving radio address on
his ninetieth birthday; 57 the gracious retirement, accompanied by a
memorable letter to his fellow justices; 58 the tranquil declining years
when, to one observer, his face fairly glowed with an inner radiance. 59
His death, three days short of his ninety-fourth birthday, was cause for
inspired reflection-here was a life that could be said to have been
fully lived, in terms of both longevity and accomplishment.
Other elements contributed to the deification of Holmes. At a time
when economic privilege was in disrepute but gracious life styles re-
tained a romantic attraction, 0 Holmes's role as transcendant Brahmin
maintained its fascination. His brand of jurisprudence was labeled
"realistic;" it served as an inspiration for legal scholars who desired
to publicize the human and institutional factors operative in judicial
decision making and to eradicate once and for all deductive logic from
the judging process. 61 His tolerance for experiments in legislation and
his relativist approach to ideas contrasted sharply with the stubborn
absolutism of the Justices who struck down New Deal legislative pro-
grams. As the primary responsibility for reform shifted from the states
to the federal government, those who believed that a vast expansion
of federal power and activity was needed to save the nation imagined
that Holmes would have supported their efforts. He thus became a lib-
eral as well as a realist.
The transcendant Brahmin theme was popularized by the appearance
in 1932 of the first full-length biography of Holmes, written by the
journalist Silas Bent. Holmes, for Bent, expanded the Puritan view
of human nature-that man is inherently selfish-to a "noble concep-
tion of a realistic and rationalized science of law." He "perceived
that jealousy and envy . . . were in fact when sublimated the basis
56 Hamilton, supra note 8.
57 Reprinted in JusicE OLvER WENDELL HoutaS: His BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED
LETTERS AND PAPERS 142 (H. Shriver ed. 1936).
58 Id. at 143.
59 C. BOWEN, YANKEE FRoMr OLYmPUS 413 (1943).
60 Cf. D. WEcTER, THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1948).
61 Cf. W. RUMBLE, AmEpuc. LEGAL REALISM (1965).
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of human justice." As a consequence, he came to advocate a mode of
lawmaking that gave each man fair scope to pursue his own self-interest.
Bent saw this as evidence that Holmes had "freed himself from the
group loyalties and prejudices and passions which are a heritage of
those reared in the security of the genteel tradition." "Never," he
maintained, "was aristocrat less dass-conscious." 62 Others pursued this
tack. "Of the many achievements of Justice Holmes," Adolf Berle wrote
in 1935, "none is more glorious than that of transcending the bounds
of his apparent emotional security."63 Augustin Derby, a former clerk
to Holmes, found him "the most democratic of men,... entirely with-
out pose."64
If Bent polished Holmes's image as aristocratic democrat, Karl Lle-
wellyn served a similar function in the emergence of Holmes as realist.
Llewellyn had himself been one of the early and major spokesmen for
realism-in 1930 and 1931 he had written law review articles that an-
nounced the emergence of a realistic jurisprudence which combined a
sense of the sterility and artificiality of legal rules with a belief in
the importance of manipulation and rationalization in governmental
decision making.6 5 This point of view was not original, Llewellyn
maintained; "Holmes' mind had travelled most of the road two gen-
erations back."6
By the date of Holmes's death, realism had become a major intel-
lectual force among American legal scholars. Llewellyn took the occa-
sion to pay tribute to the contribution of Holmes to the movement.
Because of Holmes's work, Llewellyn maintained, "it is no longer her-
esy to argue that judges have 'molecular' law-making power. . . . It is
... no longer heresy to argue that there is no brooding omnipresence
in the skies, but that the true measure of law . . . is: what, in par-
ticular, can or will anybody do about it, here and now? It is no longer
heresy to see constitutional law as a field in which economic forces,
prejudices and personalities play in an intricate, semi-concealed game,
law, politics and statesmanship together ....
62 S. Bmcr, JusTicE Ovx WEmNDEL HoLEs (1932).
63 Berle, Justice Holmes: Liberal, 24 SuRvEy GR.APHIC 178 (1935).
64 Derby, Recollections of Mr. Justice Holmes, 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 345, 345-46 (1935).
Max Lerner called Holmes "the very perfection and flowering of the New England
aristocracy." Lerner, Book Review, 46 YAix L.J. 904, 908 (1937). Morris Cohen found him to
have "intellectual power and the true liberal attitude that enabled him to rise above his
hereditary class prejudices." Cohen, Justice Holmes, 82 NEw REPuBLIC 206, 207 (1935).
65 E.g., Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLuM. L. Rnv. 431
(1930), Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222 (1931).
66 Llewellyn, supra note 65, at 454.
67 Llewellyn, Holmes, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 485, 487-88 (1935).
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The most compelling image of Holmes in the nine years after 1931,
however, was that of liberal. The major representation of him in that
role was made by Felix Frankfurter in Mr. Justice Holmes and the
Supreme Court, published in 1938. Frankfurter had himself made the
transition from progressive to New Dealer without strain 68-he saw
the experiments of the Roosevelt administrations as enlightened rec-
ognition of the need to adjust social policies pragmatically in order to
meet the demands of an increasingly complex civilization. In Frank-
furter's view, Holmes "threw the weight of his authority on the side
of social readjustments through legislation." Holmes analyzed "with
... clarity the governing elements in the modern economic struggle,"
Frankfurter maintained, "[and] found nothing in the Constitution to
prevent legislation which sought to remove some of the more obvious
inequalities in the distribution of economic power." He "[did not]
believe that there was anything in the Constitution to bar even a con-
scious use of the taxing power for readjusting the social equilibrium."
He "was loath to find a governmental vacuum . . . where there was
no intersection of federal and state authority." 69 In short, Holmes was
an ancestral New Dealer, as he had been for Llewellyn an ancestral
realist.
The intellectual community of the 1930s was quick to support
Frankfurter's interpretation. Perhaps the most enthusiastic acclaim
came from the New York Times, which described Holmes as the "lib-
eral and lovable philosopher" whose "scores of opinions ... testif[ied]
to his liberalism" 70 and who was "known through the world for his
liberal interpretations of the law in cases involving property rights and
personal rights." 71 Upon Holmes's death the Times called him the
"chief liberal of [the] supreme bench for 29 years. 72
The 1930s thus saw Holmes elevated to demigod by the intellec-
tual community.73 If he had been "the idol of the progressives who
68 The transition was not so easy for others; many progressives parted company with
the New Deal. See 0. GRAHAM, JR., AN ENCORE FOR REFORM (1967).
69 F. FRANRFURTMR, MR. JUsTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 44, 36-37, 43, 86 (1938).
70 N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1932, § 1, at 3, col. 4.
71 Id. at col. 6.
72 N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1935, § 1, at I, cols. 2-3.
73 Amidst the shower of praise for Holmes in the 1930s came an occasionally querulous
or critical note, foreshadowing a later shift in tone. H.L. Mencken felt that there was
"no evidence in Holmes' decisions that he evcr gave any really profound thought to
the great battle of ideas that raged in his time." Holmes had "no ...genuine belief in
democracy," Mencken argued, and his decisions demonstrated "a widespread and beautiful
inconsistency." Further, the "peculiar salacity" of Holmes's opinions, which made them
"interesting as literature," derived in Mencken's opinion from an "easy-going cynicism."
Holmes, Mencken felt, "had a considerable talent for epigrams," and when "once his
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believed that America must evolve and change," 74 he was even more
revered by the reformers of the 1930s, who had added to their cri-
teria for statesmanship a commitment to majoritarian relativism and
a "realistic" approach to social planning. Although he symbolized the
grandeur of a more distant, and for some a more gentlemanly, era,
he also appeared-particularly in light of the Court-packing crisis and
the "switch in time"---distinctly a man of the times.
D. 1941-1949: Demythologizing
Holmes's reputation had been too closely linked to an implicit set
of social priorities not to be altered with the replacement of that set
by another. His unequivocal deference to the whims of majorities was
destined to become a subject of controversy as the intellectual com-
munity lost faith in the judgment of sheer numbers. As early as 1919
it had been suggested that Holmes believed "that there can be ... no
standard of evaluation except the principle that might makes right."75
In 1940 Lon Fuller had pursued a similar line of analysis in observing
that Holmes's influence as a judge "fell far short of being commen-
surate with his general intellectual stature." Fuller attributed this
condition to Holmes's "notion that the law is something severable
from one's notions of what it ought to be." 76 The absence of any
overriding set of moral values in Holmes's jurisprudence caused in-
creasing anxiety in the intellectual community after 1941, when ideals
of civilization and justice seemed challenged in a variety of ways by
the Axis powers.
The most sensational manifestation of this anxiety was a series of
articles by Jesuit theologians and law professors which linked Holmes's
ideology with that of totalitarian regimes. Between 1941 and 1943,
mood had brought him to this or that judgment the announcement of it was sometimes
more than a little affected by purely literary impulse .... [T]he result was ... now and
then . . . far more literature than law." Mencken, The Great Holmes Mystery, 26 AMER-
IcAN Macutay 123, 124 (1932). Kenneth Reiblich, in a 1939 analysis of Holmes's conflict-
of-laws opinions, found that "certain concepts seemed to be accepted [by Holmes] as
apriori truths and applied with little indication of the realism which one might have
expected to find." Reiblich found puzzling the "conviction that Mr. Justice Holmes,
the liberal and realist, becomes in conflict of laws the conservative and conceptualist."
Reiblich, The Conflict of Laws Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes, 28 Gao. L.J. 1, 12,
20-21 (1939). Meanwhile, Walter Nelles and Samuel Mermin had concluded that "in his
approach to labor questions Holmes was free from all such sentimentality as is expressed
in talk of 'human rights' or 'brotherhood of man.' There was no humanitarian softness
in his head." Nelles & Mermin, Holmes and Labor Law, 13 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 517 (1936).
74 Villard, Issues and Men: The Great Judge, 140 NATION 323 (1935).
75 Bode, Justice Holmes, Natural Law, and the Moral Ideal, 29 INTERNAT'L J. ETHICS
397 (1919).
76 L. Fu.R.a, Tim LAw IN QumST OF ITsELF 62-63 (1940).
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four critiques of this nature appeared. Two of the articles, written by
Francis Lucey, attempted to show that Holmes's philosophy was "akin
to Hitler's" and that if adopted "would be the death knell of our de-
mocracy."77 For Holmes, Lucey maintained, "there [were] no moral
oughts, . . just plain, unadulterated physical force of the majority
imposing itself on all." "If ... Holmes was correct," Lucey concluded,
"Hitler is correct."78 John Ford published a similar piece in 1942
which summarized Holmes's thought as follows: "The essence of law
is physical force. Might makes legal right. The law is to be divorced
from all morality. There is no such thing as a moral ought-it is a
mere fiction .... There is no absolute truth .... There is too much
fuss about the sanctity of human life. To the state man is a means to
be sacrificed if necessary in the interest of the state. The ultimate
arbiter of all life is physical force." These attitudes scandalized Ford,
who saw them as the ultimate rationale for facist and communist dic-
tatorships.7 9 The fourth such critique of Holmes, written by Paul
Gregg, equated Holmes's "pragmatism"--a philosophy which for Gregg
assumed that "ideas, logic, reason, morals, and all else, are merely
tools by which plans of action are forged and made to work"--with
"the latest social experiment in Nazi Germany." "Who can say," Gregg
asked, "that the United States, at some future time, will not be domi-
nated by bureaucrats whose social philosophy is kindred to that of
Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, and Himmler?" "[T]otalitarianism and
dictatorship," Gregg felt, "can live and flourish under pragmatism....
If totalitarianism ever becomes the form of American government, its
leaders, no doubt, will canonize as one of the patron saints Mr. Justice
Holmes. For his popularization of the pragmatic philosophy of law
has done much to pave the way."810
- The ideas advanced in these four articles were popularized by Ben
Palmer in an essay entitled "Hobbes, Holmes, and Hitler," which
appeared in the American Bar Association Journal in 1945. In Palmer's
view, "the fact that Holmes was a polished gentleman who did not go
about like a storm-trooper knocking people down and proclaiming
the supremacy of the blonde beast should not blind us to his legal
philosophy that might makes right, that law is the command of the
dominant social group." Holmes's jurisprudence, for Palmer, sanc-
tioned "the iron fist of absolute power wielded without possibility of
77 Lucey, Jurisprudence and the Future Social Order, 16 SocIAL Sc. 211 (1941).
78 Lucey, Natural Law and American Legal Realism, 80 GEo. L.J. 493, 512, 531 (1942).
79 Ford, The Fundamentals of Holmes' Juristic Philosophy, 11 FoRDHAm L. Ruv. 255,
275 (1942).
80 Gregg, The Pragmatism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 31 GEo. L.J. 262, 284, 293, 294 (1943).
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external restraint because of any protest of impotent individuals or
minorities." "If totalitarianism comes to America," Palmer maintained,
" , .. it will come through dominance in the judiciary of men who
have accepted a philosophy of law that has... its fruition in implica-
tions from the philosophy of Holmes."81
The association of Holmes with totalitarianism sparked a debate that
was, in its ramifications, to preoccupy legal scholars in America for a
further decade. At the core of the debate was the question whether
the American legal system embodied any absolute moral principles or
whether it merely exemplified contemporary social norms. In the 1940s
it seemed especially distressing for American intellectuals, particularly
those of a religious persuasion, to deny that lawmaking in the United
States flowed from unalterable humanitarian principles. In other parts
of the world, denial of such standards seemed to have created patently
inhumane governments. America had made a commitment to combat
these nations, and philosophies that assumed that "whatever works is
right" appeared intolerable to those who supported this struggle.
The Jesuit attack on Holmes, then, was an extreme manifestation
of a general tendency of intellectuals in the 1940s to reassess Holmes's
philosophy in relation to their own thinking. At a time when "prag-
matism" and "realism" had evolved, in some circles, from words sug-
gesting progressive social reform to words heralding the coming of
totalitarianism, one group of Holmes's critics maintained that such
labels were inadequate to describe the breadth and depth of his char-
acter. These critics defended Holmes by emphasizing the complexities
and contradictions in his thought. Daniel Boorstin suggested in a 1941
article that "the inadequacy of labels like 'liberal' and 'conservative'
quickly appears" in describing Holmes. "In his earnestness to encom-
pass all philosophies and yet to commit himself to none," Boorstin
maintained, Holmes made "his personal world of ideas" one "of doubt
and conflict." He "clearly felt the tug of opposing forces": his "New
England conservative tradition" and his "intensely liberal individual-
ity."8 2 Max Lerner noted in Holmes "a deep conflict between skepticism
and belief, between mind and faith, between a recognition that men
act in terms of a cold calculation of interests, and a recognition also
that they are moved by symbols." Holmes tried, in Lerner's view, "to
construct a philosophy of life for himself which would allow him to
take account of both strains."' a Francis Biddle referred to Holmes's
81 Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes, and Hitler, 31 A.B.A.J. 569, 571-73 (1945).
82 Boorstin, The Elusiveness of Mr. Justice Holmes, 14 NEw ENGLAND Q. 478, 480-81
(1941).
83 M. Lmum, Tm Mm Aim FArm oF JusTicE HoLME 373 (1943).
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"dualism of skeptic and moralist, of doubter and preacher." "He dis-
trusted affirmations," Biddle felt, "yet . . . made them with an over-
simplification that was only partially concealed by the form of witty
aphorism which they usually took."84
To be sure, the 1940s were marked by some older images of Holmes.
Felix Frankfurter persisted in emphasizing Holmes's ability to "tran-
scend his emotional attachments." "New Englander of New Englanders
in his feelings all his life," Frankfurter wrote of Holmes in 1944, "[he]
disciplined himself against any kind of parochialism in his thinking....
He reached the democratic result by . . . his disbelief in ultimate
answers to social questions. Thereby he exhibited the judicial func-
tion at its purest."8' 5 Morton White maintained that Holmes was "a
serious comrade-in-arms of the liberal, progressive, and professional
movement for reform" and felt that his "intellectual outlook was per-
meated with a good many of the ideas that were stirring the liberals
of his time."8 6 But the tone of the commentators had altered. If the
Jesuit critics and their popularizers were regarded as aberrational, they
nonetheless symbolized an unconscious decision by American intellec-
tuals to, as Walton Hamilton put it, "elevate Mr. Justice Holmes from
deity to mortality."87 From that decision emerged a complex image
of Holmes as a man whose thought and character contained contra-
dictory forces and whose apparently facile self-assurance masked the
considerable strain he must have felt in attempting to reconcile them.
If the passions of the war-scarred 1940s stimulated some of the most
savage evaluations of Holmes, they also generated some of the most
mature.
E. 1950-1959: Sense of Alienation
Whatever Holmes had been to American intellectuals from 1880
through the 1940s, he had been relevant. His relationship to his heri-
tage, his approach to constitutional issues, his jurisprudential principles
had touched on powerful themes for the intellectual community.
But after 1950, critics of Holmes tended increasingly to reveal their
sense of the widening gulf between his world and theirs. The man
who had been dateless for Hamilton in 1941 suddenly became dated.
The decade commenced with a continuation of the impassioned
84 F. BIDDLE, MR. JusTicE HOLMES 95 (1942).
85 Frankfurter, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 21 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 417,
423 (1944).
86 M. WnrrE, supra note 34, at 104, 74.
s7 Hamilton, supra note 8, at 1.
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debate that had begun in the 1940s. Harold McKinnon denounced
Holmes's philosophy as "a symbol of our intellectual wretchedness, a
conspicuous example of our abandonment of those spiritual, philo-
sophical and moral truths that have been the life of the western
tradition." 88 Father Lucey also returned to the attack, again compar-
ing Holmes to Hitler.89 Supporters of Holmes continued to defend
him. Fred Rodell wrote that "Holmes took pains to make clear ...
that his skepticism had never bred in him the cynicism of defeat and
despair, and that, in the realm of ought-to-be, he held strong moral and
ethical views concerning decency and justice among mankind." 90 Mark
DeWolfe Howe stated that Holmes "did not deny that a primary
source of law is the realm of moral standards in which society has its
being, and . . . considered the first responsibility of the lawyer and
judge to be that of bringing the law into conformity with those moral
standards." Howe's essay was colored by a sense that his generation
was affected by concerns that had not affected Holmes. The adverse
criticism of Holmes's skepticism, Howe felt, was "partly the result of
the glimpse which Hitler gave us of cynicism triumphant. We have
begun to ask ourselves whether, despite Holmes, there are not some
standards of decency so fundamental and so permanent that they may
properly be described as absolute." Having experienced a sense of the
depths of man's inhumanity to man, Howe and his contemporaries
of the 1950s were not, in his judgment, "intellectually willing and
emotionally able to accept that total skepticism which led Holmes
to question whether man has a cosmic significance 'different in kind
from that which belongs to a baboon or a grain of sand.' "91 They
needed to believe that moral principles buttressed the universe; that
civilization imposed limits on man's behavior. "Holmes' words are
read now," Henry Hart wrote in 1951, "when the foundations of all
things are being re-examined. The moral claims of settled law in a
constitutional democracy must not today be overlooked." 92 Holmes
himself had not experienced the horrors of a wholly amoral world.
Charles Wyzanski emphasized Holmes's faith in the ultimate triumph
of reason. Wyzanski attributed this faith to the fact that "Holmes
wrote before the world had fully appreciated the wickedness of which
88 McKinnon, The Secret of Mr. Justice Holmes, 36 A.B.AJ. 261, 345 (1950).
89 Lucey, Holmes-Liberal-Humanitarian-Believer in Democracy?, 39 Gro. L.J. 523,
548, 553 (1951).
90 Rodell, Justice Holmes and His Hecklers, 60 YAi. L.J. 620, 623 (1951).
91 Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 H4Iv. L. REv. 529, 544-45 (1951).
92 Hart, Holmes' Positivism-An Addendum, 64 HARv. L. REv. 929, 937 (1951).
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civilized man is capable. He knew not the Nazi concentration camps
• * , nor the Communist disciplined subordination of man's interest
in truth to man's interest in material progress." 93
Intellectuals of the 1950s thus felt that Holmes's conclusions were
founded on assumptions about the nature of man that differed from
their own. This view led critics to treat him as a figure from another
age, an approach that occasionally led to debunking" or redefinition9 5
of his political views. In the main, however, alienation from Holmes
took the form of attempts to place him at a distant point in time. This
was the major thrust of the three principal books written about Holmes
in the 1950s: Henry Steel Commager's The American Mind, Samuel
Konefsky's The Legacy of Holmes and Brandeis, and Mark DeWolfe
Howe's Mr. Justice Holmes: The Shaping Years. Commager identified
Holmes with "the progressive movement['s] ... inability to fulfill itself
without imposing far reaching readjustments upon the legal mechanics
of economy."9 6 Konefsky found Holmes "backward" and "singularly
static" in "his conception of the economic universe" and maintained
that his thought was "filled with a good many fallacies and superficial
preconceptions which he assumed to be basic truths," including his
"imperturbable confidence in the capacity of society to defy artificial
93 Wyzanskl, The Democracy of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 7 VAND. L. REV. 311, 319
(1954).
94 Martin Hickman's "reappraisal" of Holmes revealed "a man arrogant beyond the
ordinary, a man of narrow and oligarchical sympathies," whose "indulgence of the legis-
lature . . . rested at least as much on contempt as on tolerance." The stereotype of
Holmes that he "was a champion of free speech and civil rights, that he was compassionate
and solicitous for the defenseless," Hickman argued, was not supported by "an examination
of the cases." There "is a hollow ring to the finely turned phrases." Hickman, Mr. Justice
Holmes: A Reappraisal, 5 W. POL. Q. 66, 83, 73 (1952). Merle Pusey, in his biography of
Charles Evans Hughes, wrote that the "Holmes whom the judges knew had little in
common with the humanitarian crusader of the same name who has so often been extolled
in print. Holmes' brethren knew that he didn't care a straw for the 'social' or 'progressive'
legislation that he was said to be heroically defending . . . . [They] were well aware of
his scorn for any deviation from the result he thought the law required because that
result might be 'unjust' to the individuals concerned." 1 M. PusEy, CHAP.XS EvANs
HuGcRS 287, 289 (1951).
95 Irving Bernstein announced that the "cherished American myth . . . that Oliver
Wendell Holmes was a liberal" was "as baseless as the tale of Washington and the
cherry tree." Holmes, according to Bernstein, was "as profound, as civilized, and articulate
a conservative as the United States has produced." He was "a firm believer in capitalism
who looked with distrust upon governmental intervention in economic life. Monopolies
won his respect, while he regarded unions and strikes suspiciously . . . . Movements
seeking the reform or reconstruction of economic society won his distrust .... Free speech
for Holmes was a Darwinian arena in which ideas would struggle for survival. It was at
the same time a prop of a conservative society." Bernstein, The Conservative justice
Holmes, 23 NEw ENGrLAND Q. 435, 445, 449 (1950).
96 H.S. COMmAGER, ThE AMascAN MIND 374 (1950).
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meddling with its natural evolution. ' 97 Howe saw Holmes's aesthetic
judgment as "responsive to older modes of expression and earlier
moods of feeling." His biography of Holmes, Howe observed, was
largely "an essay in intellectual history."98
The works of the 1950s presented a composite picture of Holmes as
a man whose thought failed, despite its breadth, to encompass the
problems of mid-twentieth century existence. A series of inevitabilities
ruled Holmes's world: iron economic laws, natural selection of ideas
and social policies, the continual progress of civilization. These in-
evitabilities marked the thought of an older age where, in light of a
series of consoling faiths, men could afford to be skeptical. Life in the
mature twentieth century, in the minds of American intellectuals, en-
couraged no such faiths.
F. 1960-: Holmes and Libertarianism-Egalitarianism
In the 1960s, attention turned to the problems caused by the in-
equalities and diversities among Americans. Integration-racial, psy-
chological, cultural-became a dominant concept as the decade opened.
Intellectuals emphasized once more the responsibilities of elites to
those less privileged and stressed the fundamental values-liberty,
democracy, egalitarianism, impartial justice-that bound Americans
together. Critics of Holmes asked again whether he had understood
the social obligations of leadership or the consensual values embedded
in the process of lawmaking in America. Their answer, by and
large, was negative on both counts. Critics alleged that as both a
man and a judge Holmes had been indifferent to the needs of the
underprivileged. They pointed to the distance Holmes felt between
himself and less socially and intellectually privileged Americans, and to
his apparent lack of concern for civil-liberties interests in certain cases.
"It would be easy.., to create the impression," Edmund Wilson
wrote of Holmes in 1962, "that [he] was an egregious social snob of a
peculiarly provincial kind."' 9 Commentators on Holmes as Brahmin
did occasionally attempt to foster that impression, 100 but they were far
more concerned with what Wilson called the "carapace of impene-
trable indifference to current pressures and public opinion" in Holmes,
"due partly to the impregnable security of belonging to the Boston
'Brahmin' caste."'' Distance, withdrawal, isolation, and detachment
97 S. KoNEFssy, THE LEGACY OF HOLMEs AND BRANSaS 59, 24, 64, 303 (1956).
98 M. HowE, supra note 7, at 10, vi.
99 E. WILSON, PATRIOTiC Go=z 784 (1962).
100 E.g., Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. Cm. L. Ray. 213, 230 (1964).
101 E. WLsoN, supra note 99, at 782-83.
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became the chief aspects of Holmes's Brahminism that interested critics.
Mark DeWolfe Howe emphasized Holmes's prolonged withdrawal from
society and his feeling that his destiny lay in areas, such as scholarship,
that were isolated from the world at large.102 Yosal Rogat accentuated
Holmes's "preoccupation with the theme of the observer-the spec-
tator." "[His] participation in public, and perhaps even in private,
experience had an attentuated quality," Rogat wrote, "and [he] with-
drew, perhaps consciously, from important areas of shared human ex-
perience."' 03 Saul Touster provided a charitable explanation for
Holmes's Brahmin detachment. "Holmes," Touster maintained, "was
* .. a profoundly injured spirit." "The deadening of sympathetic feel-
ings, the Olympian aloofness, the spectator view,... the disbelief in
causes" were devices "by which he somehow [could] gain distance from
the world." Touster found that Holmes's "expressions of sympathy and
doubt and feelings for the distress of the Negro were suppressed" in his
later life; "suppression of feeling," he maintained, "may be the
product not of the absence of feeling, but an excess of it."'' 4
Others in the 1960s viewed aloofness in Holmes less sympathetically.
Francis Biddle, in an otherwise laudatory assessment, described
Holmes as "an aristocrat and a conservative" who "had little sympathy
with the sufferings and failures of mankind, and no urgent desire to
change their lot."'1 5 Rogat felt that "to a remarkable degree, Holmes
simply did not care .... Precisely because he thought that 'the crowd'
was unwise, he expected them to destroy the way of life that he pre-
ferred. But he would have thought it immature to be deeply concerned
about that imminent destruction."' 0 6 Robert Faulkner saw Holmes's
skepticism and deference to majority views as manifestations of "a
certain disdain toward minorities and the weak generally.' 07
For intellectuals of the 1960s, belief in certain fundamental guaran-
tees of equal treatment for minorities and certain permanent individual
rights was an important aspect of enlightened social thought. In the
context of their own full-blown libertarianism-egalitarianism, repre-
sentatives of the American intellectual community found Holmes's
response to civil liberties shocking. Rogat, the leading critic, set out to
disprove the widely held belief that Holmes was a champion of civil
liberties. In cases involving "various claims to civil and political rights
102 M. HowE, supra note 11, at 1-8, 256 (1963).
103 Rogat, supra note 100, at 230.
104 Touster, In Search of Holmes From Within, 18 VAND. L. REV. 437, 470, 450-51 (1965).
105 F. BIDDLE, JUSTICE HOLMEs, NATURAL LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT 7 (1961).
106 Rogat, supra note 100, at 255.
107 R. FAULKNER, THE JUoSPRrD cE OF JOHN MARSHALL 253 (1968).
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that arose out of the Civil War Amendments," for example, Rogat
maintained that Holmes was "consistent" in "denying the claimed
right" and "weighed the substantive claim to equality lightly." In alien
cases Holmes "wrote as if anyone seeking entry was merely a suppliant."
"Nowhere" did he "help in framing a remedy to secure a constitutional
right. He did not develop further any inchoate right or liberty, or
broaden the scope of those which were already established." In short,
Rogat found that "the accepted image of Holmes as uniquely liber-
tarian owes more to fantasies unloosed by the attractiveness of his
personality than to the realities of his career." Holmes's striking in-
sensitivity to civil rights and liberties stemmed, Rogat maintained,
from a "fundamentally impoverished account of legal phenomena." He
"did not sufficiently distinguish a crude system of social control, resting
on naked power, from a distinctively legal method of control." He
seemed "never... to have perceived, and certainly never acknowledged,
the extent to which general commitments to fairness, generality and
neutrality are built into the idea of legality and constitute part of its
meaning... Holmes spoke as if a legal sysem were simply a mechanism
to enforce by whatever means, the desires of the dominant group,"
ignoring the extent to which law in America was premised on notions
of equitable attention to the needs of minorities and guarantees of
equal justice.108
Faulkner also found that an "orientation by moral and political
ends [was] absent from Holmes' jurisprudence." Holmes, for Faulkner,
"left vacant [the] essence [of judicial decision making]: a reasonable
view of what constitutes justice in America." The "besetting and deep-
est flaw of Holmes' thought" was a tendency to prefer abstractions to
"humane ends." Instead of giving attention to the pressing needs of
interests at particular points in time, Faulkner argued, Holmes sub-
scribed to a "fundamentally optimistic fatalism" which allowed history
to usurp the role of the judge in doing justice. Holmes believed, accord-
ing to Faulkner, that "man's interests are automatically ever better
served .... ." "[He] presupposed . . . the justice of history."'09
Critics of the 1960s expanded the concept of civil liberty in finding
Holmes wanting as a civil libertarian. Writers of the 1920s and 1930s
who had hailed Holmes as a champion of civil liberties had made
assumptions about the nature of rights in civilized society different
from those made by their counterparts in the 1960s. They had assumed
that liberties-such as that of contract and that of speech-were not
108 Rogat, supra note 17, at 254-55, 24, 305, 308; Rogat, supra note 100, at 225.
100 R. FAuLKNtR, supra note 107, at 264-65, 263, 247-49.
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absoliites, but-were subsumed'in' the consensual values of contemporary
America. Their view was that expressed by Justice Brandeis in two
decisions in 1921: "Rights. . . must be remoulded, from time to time,
to meet the changing needs of society."110 "All rights derive from the
purposes of the society in which they exist; above all rights rises duty
to the community.""' They considered Holmes a libertarian because in
certain decisions he had protected freedom of speech where it did not
immediately threaten national interests. For Holmes, the liberty flowed
not from any inherent right of the individual but from the interest of
society in a free flow of ideas. By the 1960s, however, the standard of
libertarianism had altered; a social definition of civil rights seemed in-
equitable. Racial equality seemed to demand a philosophical definition
that provided for the inherent equality of individuals and the absolute
nature of human rights. No longer could society have one standard of
rights for one set of persons and a second for another-that constituted
a deprivation of inalienable guaranties. In this context Holmes's easy
approval of majoritarian discriminations against minorities appeared
unconscionably nonlibertarian.
The 1960s marked the nadir of Holmes's image. Critics seemed
unwilling to undertake charitable interpretations of any of his charac-
teristics: his Brahminism was considered snobbishness, diffidence, and
insensitivity; his ideological presuppositions were thought to exhibit
both a shocking indifference to humanitarian values and a complacent
insularity about the inevitability of progress. The great repute in which
Holmes had been held in earlier years seemed to critics of the 1960s to
be a glaring example of the distasteful set of values that had dominated
American civilization in their immediate past. The ideal they held of
a society whose guardians perceived the democratic and egalitarian
principles at its core clashed with qualities and beliefs they found in
Holmes.
III. HOLMES AND THE CKincs: A CONCLUDING ASSESSMENT
Despite its diversity, the critical literature on Holmes almost uni-
formly fails to assess him on his own historical terms. Holmes was, first
and foremost, a late nineteenth century intellectual radical. He was
concerned with smashing existing fixed systems of the universe and sub-
stituting a fluid one. The .Common Law was his most telling work-it
was critical of the quasi-religious formalistic logic of his time and sup-
portive of two fluid organizing concepts, history and community values.
110 Tnuax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S .312, 376 (1921).
11 Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 US. 443, 488 (1921).
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At the close of the nineteenth century, Holmes attempted through sci-
ence to make the concept of community values a tangible, measureable
one. In this task he foreshadowed the efforts of social planners in the
early twentieth century. But as that century dawned, Holmes gave up
his effort and came to rest on the belief that the universe was unknow-
able, that ultimate values were in the end merely personal prejudices,
and that change come through the fluctuating superiority of such preju-
dices. Ultimately his ideology presumed an open and ever-changing
system of intellectual intercourse-an unregulated market of ideas.
This was his famous skepticism.
Because Holmes equated prevailing social values and ideals with
prejudices, his ideology was profoundly apolitical. Late nineteenth cen-
tury commentators made the mistake of identifying his intellectual
radicalism with political radicalism. The progressives also erred in
thinking that since Holmes believed in fluidity and change, he, like
they, ascribed a positive value to change. But in giving up any belief
in scientific measurement of social desires, Holmes had also given up
a faith in the ability of social planners to achieve progress through an
enlightened reordering of social priorities. If beliefs could not be
measured, he felt, they could not be ranked. He thus rested on "what
the crowd wants." The progressives, in contrast, wanted to educate the
"crowd" to desire those things that the progressives believed right-
thinking twentieth century Americans should desire.
The hero worshippers of the 1930s made a similar error in their
evaluations of Holmes. They ascribed to him the positive as well as the
negative components of attitudes, whereas Holmes held only the nega-
tive. Because Holmes believed that ideas should have free expression-
a belief he often justified by saying that the process of airing those
ideas would convince people of their absurdity-and because some of
his free speech decisions had involved members of minority groups,
Holmes became a protector of minorities and a transcendant Brahmin.
His approach to free speech, in fact, assumed the ultimate impotence of
all forms of unpopular expression. Because Holmes was critical of
nineteenth century judicial formalism and had demonstrated a con-
sciousness of the element of bias in judicial decision making, he was
said to support the whole of realism. But Holmes did not believe that
psychology was the major component of decision making, and he
opposed the kind of empirical internal study of institutions that the
realists advocated. Because Holmes had taken a passive stance toward
state experimentive schemes in the 1910s and 1920s, critics of the
1930s assumed that he would be not only equally passive toward the
federal programs of the New Deal, but sympathetic to what the New
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Deal represented.7 But Holmes had never been enthusiastic about pater-
nalistic legislation. He took a fatalistic view of man's nature and
muttered about who was going to "pay the bill."
The demythologizers of the 1940s, though more sensitive than their
earlier predecessors to the complexities in Holmes, still regarded him
as "dateless." His apolitical, laissez faire skepticism was read as the
equivalent of those bogeys of the 1940s, pragmatism and totalitarian-
ism. Only in the 1950s did intellectuals begin to see a gap between
Holmes's universe and their own. This perception appeared largely in
the form of strained efforts to make him "moral" in 1950s terms-to
show that had he comprehended the horror of totalitarian regimes he
would have demonstrated greater concern for political values.
The critics of the 1960s continued to view Holmes through the lens
of contemporary events. Their annoyance at his apparent absence of
concern for libertarian principles rested on an expanded definition of
liberties. Like the progressives, writers of the 1960s matched all previ-
ous eras against their own; Holmes, whose thought was shaped in a
world that had far different notions of "liberty" and "equality," was
destined to fall short of their standards.
But if Holmes asks, on one level, to be judged by the standards of
his age, he invites, on another level, judgment by a more timeless
standard: the capacity for being human. Here one finds a disturbing
dissonance between Holmes's very conspicuous social and professional
success-it is hard to imagine a life less marred by physical, social, or
economic deprivations or one marked by a greater length and breadth
of achievement-and his gloomy musings that "the crowd has sub-
stantially all there is,"1112 that "we all are very near despair," 13 that men
are like "flies," 14 and that man has no more cosmic significance than a
baboon or a grain of sand.115 The specter of the eminent Holmes utter-
ing such misanthropy smacks of the "old cardinal" prose of Henry
Adams that Holmes himself decried."',
Holmes's skepticism appears to have been less a striving for a positive
goal than a facile means of avoiding commitment, whether to beliefs,
institutions, or mankind itself. One is struck by the comments of
Holmes that he had remained childless because he could not bear bring-
ing children into the world and because he preferred the less-involved
112 1 HoLMEs-LASKI LrraES 207 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
113 O.W. HOLMES, CoLLECrm LEcAL PApnzs 248 (1920).
114 2 HOLMEs-LASKI Lm'rsRs 946 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
115 Cf. Howe, supra note 91.
116 Rogat, supra note 100, at 230-31.
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paternalism he felt for his law clerks."17 These statements suggest a
desire to evade the responsibilities and emotional attachments of close
involvement with other human beings, or perhaps the adoption of a
misanthropic pose to prevent others from probing into areas of his life
in which he felt vulnerable.
It is disappointing to find a man who was fortunate enough to be
made aware in his lifetime of the full measure of his accomplishment
(how many men are able to hear themselves called "the greatest of our
age in the domain of jurisprudence, and one of the greatest of the
ages"118?), yet who seemed to be so indifferent, at times savagely so, to
the lives of his fellow mortals. To be sure, Holmes had his values-
civilization, the martial virtues, and, in his own sense, democracy and
even liberty. He also had high standards of intellectual performance.
But the richness of his mind, the power of his intellect, and even the
depth of his feelings tended to degenerate into a cranky negativism that,
given his stature, seems peculiarly distasteful. It is Holmes's articulated
refusal to take pride in being human that marks him as one of the least
"heroic" of America's heroes.
117 Letter and Memorandum from Learned Hand to Mark DeWolfe Howe, Apr. 29,
1959, in M. HowE, supra note 102, at 8; Derby, supra note 64, at 352.
118 Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REv. 682, 684 (1931).
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